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We discuss a modification of the Evolutionary Minority Game (EMG) in which agents are placed
in the nodes of a regular or a random graph. A neighborhood for each agent can thus be defined
and a modification of the usual relaxation dynamics can be made in which each agent updates her
decision depending upon her neighborhood. We report numerical results for the topologies of a ring,
a torus and a random graph changing the size of the neighborhood. We find the surprising result
that in the EMG a better coordination (a lower frustration) can be achieved if agents base their
actions on local information disregarding the global trend in the self segregation process.
PACS numbers: 05.65.+b, 02.50.Le, 64.75.g, 87.23.Ge
INTRODUCTION
There are a great number of situations in which a many
agent system self organizes by coordinating individual
actions. Such coordination is usually achieved by agents
with partial information about the system, and in some
cases optimizing utility functions that conflict with each
other. A similar situation is found in many particles,
physical systems. The word “coordination” used in a
social or economic context is then replaced by “ordering”.
Examples are the growth of a crystalline structure or a
transition leading to some specific magnetic phase.
Interesting situations arise when the optimal configura-
tions for different individuals do collide with each other.
This can be due to the nature of the interactions between
the particles as in a spin glass, or by boundary conditions
which prevent a global ordering or by the constitutive
rules of a system of multiple players that prevent that
all agents can win. In these cases it is said that the sys-
tem displays some degree of frustration. An example of
a frustrated multi agent system is given by the evolu-
tionary minority game (EMG) [1] in which many players
have to make a binary choice and the winning option is
the one made by the minority. The similarities between
some variants of the Minority Game and spin glasses have
been discussed in great detail in Ref. [2].
A macroscopic signature of frustration is that the sys-
tem can not accommodate into a single, optimal state in
which the energy is a minimum but it relaxes instead to
one of many, suboptimal, equivalent configurations that
are local minima in the energy landscape. In the random
relaxation dynamic that is used for the EMG each player
continually modifies her choice searching for a winning
option. The final result is that the population is segre-
gated into two parties that take opposite actions. This
partition is not unique and also tends to reduce the frus-
tration as much as possible by minimizing the number of
losers.
The relaxation process is usually assimilated to the
search of a solution of a combinatorial optimization prob-
lem in which it is possible a strategy of “divide and con-
quer” [3], i.e. circumstances in which one can attempt
to divide the system into parts and search for separate
optima in each part. Frustration arises when such local
solutions can not be reassembled into a global optimum
also fulfilling the boundary conditions.
A relevant example of the study of the global outcome
of a local coordination strategy (i.e. involving only a
fraction of the system) is Schelling’s segregation model
[4]. Agents of two kinds are placed in a square grid. The
system relaxes to equilibrium allowing any two agents of
different kinds to exchange places if they are surrounded
by, say, a majority of agents of the opposite kind. In the
present paper we discuss a relaxation dynamics for the
EMG in which we impose a local coordination strategy.
We borrow the picture of Schelling’s models and place
the players in a lattice. It is then possible to associate a
neighborhood to each player and thus implement a local
coordination strategy letting each player to adjust her de-
cision to the situation in her neighborhood. We call this
model the Local Evolutionary Minority Game (LEMG).
A previous work in this direction is [5] in which players
are also located on the nodes of a grid but are endowed
with (two) strategies that are selected on the basis of
their successful use. This work further imposes that both
strategies have to be anticorrelated, i.e. they tend to
produce opposite actions with the same input. We stress
the evolutionary nature of the present model: players
bear no memory of past actions and do not have any
strategy in the sense of [5], to guide their actions. In spite
of this difference the effects of local coordination produce
a similar ordered pattern. We pay special attention to the
effects of such a local coordination in the optimization
process.
2THE RULES OF THE LEMG
We first consider the traditional EMG. This involves
N players that make one binary decision (0 or 1). Each
player has a probability pi; i = 1, 2, · · · , N of choosing,
say, 0. Each player receives one point if her decision
places her in the minority, and loses a point otherwise.
When her account of points falls below 0, she changes
pi → p
′
i
with p′
i
∈ [pi − ∆p, pi + ∆p], at random, and
∆p ≪ 1. Reflective boundary conditions are imposed at
pi = 0, 1. All agents are assumed to update the corre-
sponding pi’s synchronically. It is customary to display
the self-organization of the system through the probabil-
ity density function P (p) obtained in a statistical ensem-
ble of systems that are allowed to relax to equilibrium.
The value of P (p)dp is the fraction of the population
having a probability between p and p + dp of choosing,
say, 0. When the probabilistic relaxation is used, the
asymptotic function P (p) has a U-shape with two sym-
metric peaks at p ≃ 0 and p ≃ 1 thus indicating that
the N agents have segregated into two parties making
opposite decisions. The relaxation process corresponds
to the minimization of an “energy” function [6] given by
the standard deviation σ defined by:
σ2 =
∑
A
P(A)(A−N/2)2 (1)
where P(A) is the probability distribution of parties of
A agents that have chosen 0. The value of σ2 depends
upon the properties of P (p). In [6] it is proven that:
E ≡
σ2
N
= N(p¯− 1/2)2 + (p− p2) (2)
where ps =
∫
psP (p)dp. At equilibrium the linear depen-
dence of E on N disappears, and σ2 turns out to be an
extensive magnitude proportional to N . A minimization
of E is equivalent to find a distribution P (p) with the
smallest possible number of losers. In fact σ2 is related
to the number of losers because
σ2 =< (A−N/2)2 >=
< (w − ℓ)2 >
4
=
< (N − 2ℓ)2 >
4
(3)
where w (ℓ) is the number of winners (losers) and < · · · >
represents an ensemble average.
If one assumes na¨ıvely P (p) = δ(p− 1/2) correspond-
ing to a symmetric random walk (and thus eliminating
the term O(N) in Eq.[2]) one gets E = 1/4, while P (p) =
constant yields E = 1/6. A better result is obtained with
the usual random relaxation dynamics for the EMG. This
yields [6] E ≃ 1/8. Energy and frustration remain linked
to each other. For the EMG we can define frustration as
F = ℓ/N ; which fulfills 0 ≤ F ≤ 1. This definition may
also be used for any system involving a game with multi-
ple players. The value F = 0 corresponds to a situation
such as the “majority game” in which a player is a win-
ner if her decision is the same as the majority. This leads
to situations that can be assimilated to a ferromagnetic
phase (all the players (spins) have chosen the same option
(orientation)). In the EMG there are less winners than
losers, and therefore 1/2 < FEMG ≤ 1. The lowest possi-
ble frustration for the EMG is reached when the N (odd)
agents are coordinated to produce the largest possible
minority, i.e. (N − 1)/2. Thus the lowest possible frus-
tration for a finite minority game is F∗ = (1 + 1/N)/2.
We now turn to the LEMG in which the i-th player
makes her decision depending upon the situation in her
neighborhood Ni. In order to define the neighborhoods
we assume three possible spatial orderings. Two of them
correspond respectively to a one-dimensional (1D) or a
square two- dimensional (2D) regular array with peri-
odic boundary conditions (i.e. respectively a ring and a
torus). In the third arrangement the agents are placed
in the nodes of a random undirected graph with a fixed
number of neighbors for each agent so that a reciprocity
relationship is automatically fulfilled (if node i is taken
to be linked to node j, the reciprocal is also true). All
neighborhoods are assumed to have the same (odd) num-
ber n of agents (we consider that i ∈ Ni).
The rules of the LEMG are the same as for the EMG
except for the important difference that an agent wins
or loses points depending whether she is, or she is not,
in the minority of her own neighborhood. No attention
is paid to the agents that do not belong to Ni. The
LEMG coincides with the usual EMG when Ni coincides
with the complete N -agent system. In the regular or-
derings the neighborhoods are respectively a segment or
a square with an odd number of agents. The only agent
that updates her pi is located at the center of the square
or segment. Notice that an agent may be in the minor-
ity (a winner) in her neighborhood and in the majority
(a loser) when the entire system is considered, and vice
versa.
Let us consider the simple example of an infinite linear
chain of agents and a neighborhood with n = 3. We
define Ri to be the probability that the i-th agent belongs
to the minority of Ni. We can thus write:
Ri = (1 − pi−1)pi(1− pi+1) + pi−1(1− pi)pi+1 (4)
where −∞ ≤ i ≤ ∞. The probability that all agents are
winners is R =
∏
i
Ri. Obviously R = 1 if and only if
Ri = 1, ∀i. This is possible only if pi = 1 and pi±1 =
0. This corresponds to a pattern in which 0’s and 1’s
alternate with a period of 2. Larger neighborhoods give
also rise to periodic solutions with larger (even) periods.
Any finite ring with an odd number of agents is frustrated
because such periodicity can not fit along the chain.
Equation [4] can be used to construct a (deterministic)
relaxation dynamics to adjust the pi’s climbing along the
gradient of Ri. We thus assume pi(t + 1) = pi(t) + ∆pi
3and set
∆pi = η∂Ri/∂pi = η(1 − pi−1 − pi+1) (5)
with 1 ≫ η > 0. A stationary (∆pi = 0 ∀i) solution for
this dynamics is pi = 1/2 ; ∀i. This solution is unstable
because any random perturbation of any pi leads to a sit-
uation in which ∆pi 6= 0 ∀i [7]. This dynamics stabilizes
a pattern of 0’s and 1’s that alternate with each other.
In fact if pi+1 and pi−1 are both greater (smaller) than
1/2, then ∆pi < 0(> 0) thus forcing pi < 1/2(> 1/2).
This relaxation dynamics is therefore expected to lead to
distributions P (p) that vanish at p = 1/2.
RESULTS
Self-segregation
In Fig.1 we show the results of E = σ2/N as a function
of the size parameter S defined as the ratio S = n/N
obtained in several numerical experiments. The value
for S = 1 corresponds to EEMG obtained for the EMG.
In this section we only discuss results for N = 121. We
have considered the topologies of a ring, a “square” torus
(with N = 11 × 11), and of random graphs. In all the
cases considered, the values of ES with S ≪ 1 fulfill ES <
EEMG. This feature is stressed in Fig.1 with an horizontal
line drawn at the value of EEMG. The value of ES for
regular 1D and 2D lattices grows with S and for S ≃ .5
becomes even larger that EEMG.
The corresponding density distributions P (p) are
shown in Fig.2 for several values of S. These are com-
pared with the distribution PEMG(p). We observe that
PS(p) with S ≪ 1 are always symmetric and U-shaped
as PEMG(p) but they differ from this in the fact that
they vanish around p = 1/2. This agrees with the dis-
cussion given above for the linear chain. As we shortly
discuss, this turns out to be a highly relevant and gen-
eral feature of the LEMG. Such distributions are a better
approximation to an ideal distribution
P (p) =
N − 1
2N
[δ(p) + δ(p− 1)] +
1
N
δ(p− 1/2) (6)
that yields the optimal value of E∗
EMG
= 1/4N (and
F∗
EMG
= (1 + 1/N)/2). A noticeable dip is produced
for S = (N − 2)/N . This can be understood in the fol-
lowing way. Assume that a symmetric distribution P (p)
has already developed and two agents are removed in or-
der that the i−th player can check her decision in her
neighborhood of N − 2 agents. If the two agents that
have been removed have p > 1/2 (p < 1/2) the i−th
agent has the single winning option of choosing pi ≃ 1
(pi ≃ 0). In the other cases (one player with p > 1/2 and
the other with p < 1/2) her choices of approaching 0 or
1 have equal probability. The net result once all players
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FIGURE 1
FIG. 1: σ2/N as as a function of the size parameter S for
different topologies of the N = 121 players system. Panel a)
corresponds to a ring, panel b) to a square torus and panel
c) to a random graph. Lines are drawn to guide the eye.
Empty and filled symbols correspond respectively to results
obtained with and without annealing (see the text). Data
was obtained from 200 independent histories, of 5× 105 time
steps each, ∆p = 0.1 and by averaging over the last 2000 time
steps of all the histories. The annealing protocol consists in
resetting all accounts to zero every 500 iterations. This is
repeated 800 times. The fluctuations observed in the lower
curve of panel a) subsist in simulations with a much richer
statistics (see the text).
have updated her respective p’s in the same fashion is to
force the resultant P (p) to drop at p=1/2 and grow at
p = 0, 1 as discussed for the linear chain. This argument
can be extended for neighborhoods of other sizes.
The Optimization Problem
The shape of PS(p) changes with S. For intermediate
values (for instance S = 81/121) this distribution has
radically changed from the shape of a U to a two wing
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FIG. 2: Examples of the density distribution P (p) for the
linear chain and different size parameters (S = 9/121, S =
81/121 and S = 1 (EMG)). The second and third curves are
offset by one and two units, respectively. Notice that the first
two curves (almost) drop to zero around p ≃ 0.5
profile with secondary maxima at both sides of p =1/2
still keeping the fact that PS(1/2) = 0. This is associated
to an increase in the number of “local winners” . In fact
after some time there are left almost no players that need
to update their pi’s (see Fig.3) while for S ≃ 0 or S ≃ 1
the relaxation process reaches a dynamical equilibrium
in which few players continuously update their pi’s.
For such intermediate values of S it is found that a mi-
nority is clearly defined in most neighborhoods and the
corresponding agents are unambiguously induced to take
one winning option. They therefore continue to accumu-
late points and cease to change their pi’s preventing the
system to reach a more efficient self-segregation.
A situation like this has been extensively discussed in
Ref.[8]. In these circumstances the relaxation process
ceases to be effective to lower the energy and the system
freezes in a configuration that is far from a better local
optimum. Although the frozen microstates do depend
upon initial conditions, the asymptotic density P (p) is
independent both because this is a density function that
is associated with a macrostate of the system and because
possible random variations are averaged out by repeat-
ing the relaxation process for a large ensemble of sys-
tems. Moreover, succesive runs to obtain E changing the
random initial configuration, yield essentially the same
result. This is indeed to be expected because the energy
is defined as the average of a statistical fluctuation, as
given in Eq.[3].
The procedure to regain the true optimal self-
segregation pattern, is to force the relaxation procedure
by periodically removing the points that have been ac-
cumulated by every player, resetting their accounts to 0.
This procedure changes only the situations in which the
system is frozen but leaves unchanged situations in which
this does not happen such as for instance for S ≃ 0 or
S ≃ 1.
These “annealing” episodes melt the system thus mak-
ing it possible to reach the best local configurations. We
have performed an annealed relaxation (with a fixed an-
nealing protocol) for all three topologies. The results are
displayed with open symbols in all three panels of Fig.1.
The fluctuations in the lower curve of panel a) for S ≃ 0.6
disappear for N ≥ 500 thus indicating that it is a finite
size artifact of the model.
A remarkable result displayed in Fig.1 is that the com-
position of local optima always yields a better coordi-
nation than the one obtained within the framework of
the EMG in which all agents are involved in the same
relaxation process.
There are actually two situations to consider. One in
which S ≃ 0 or S ≃ 1, and the other where S is within
these two extreme values. In the first case the LEMG al-
ways yields remarkably lower values of E . This is indeed
a general result, because holds true no matter the topol-
ogy and the size of the system in which the players are
located. In these cases no annealing is required because
the system never gets quenched.
Outside the neighbourhood of S ≃ 0 or S ≃ 1, the sys-
tem gets quenched, and for regular topologies a poorer
value of E (i.e. greater than EEMG) is obtained. How-
ever, for such values a better (lower) value of E can always
be obtained if the annealing procedure is used to force
the relaxation process beyond the frozen states. This
actually means that a better coordination, i.e. a lower
frustration, is achieved whenever the system is found in a
configuration that corresponds to a composition of good
local optima, and this is true in the whole range of val-
ues of S. If good local optima are guaranteed one finds
values of ES that are significantly lower that EEMG. A
typical value of ES ≃ 1/16 is obtained in this way that is
half the value EEMG ≃ 1/8.
Except for finite size effects, all the results presented
in this subsection do not differ from those obtained for
many other values of N that we have investigated.
The 2D Case
A much richer situation is found for the case in which
players are located on a grid with the topology of 2D
torus. An example is shown in Fig.4 in which N =
31× 31. The values of p are associated to shades of gray.
Frustration can be perceived in the fact that there is not a
single global ordering of black ( p ≃ 0) and white (p ≃ 1)
stripes for the whole array. These are instead grouped
in domains with different orientations or with the same
orientation but shifted with respect to each other. The
relaxation process is fast in an initial stage and slows
down once the domains have fully developed. The do-
main walls are a source of frustration. In fact, when
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FIG. 3: Number of players with zero points as a function
of the iteration number (time) for the same values of the size
parameter as in Fig.2 . In the inset we display in a linear scale
the same data up to 10,000 time steps, to put in evidence the
presence of a fast and a slow dynamics
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FIG. 4: An example of the LEMG for the topology of the
torus. Domains in the map of probabilities for a 3× 3 neigh-
borhood. Each pixel represents a player; the corresponding
pi are shown as shades of gray.
such stage has been reached all the agents that have 0
points and continue to update their pi’s are located in
the domain walls giving rise to a slow dynamics in which
walls move enlarging or shrinking domains. The whole
picture resembles a crystallization process; for a value of
S grater than a critical threshold, all domains collapse
into a single pattern of stripes. Frustration shows up as
an indented (fuzzy) border in some of the stripes. These
results will be discussed in detail elsewhere.
CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the organization pattern achieved by
many agents playing an EMG with local coordination.
We find important differences between the coordination
achieved when the whole ensemble of agents participates
in the same relaxation process or when local coordination
is imposed.
According to the present results, the LEMG is an ex-
ample in which a better coordination or, what is the
same, a lower frustration, can be achieved provided that
the self organization is ruled by a local process, i.e.
if agents govern their actions paying no attention to
global trends of the system but rather to her immedi-
ate neighborhood. In the LEMG, this statement holds
true even in the case in which very few agents are re-
moved (S ≃ (N − 2)/N ) from the whole ensemble. The
fact that a more efficient coordination is achieved by ig-
noring what happens to the total ensemble of players is
expected to be a feature of a special kind of multi-agent
systems. Other coordination problems may not behave
in this fashion, thus allowing a classification of coordina-
tion games into classes linked to the type of optimization
problem that is being “solved” by the ensemble of agents.
Further investigation should be devoted to classify multi
agent games into those that fulfil this property and those
that can not be optimized by braking them into pieces.
It is found that the LEMG displays some of the features
that are typical of antiferromagnetic systems including
the emergence of domains, frustration, fast and slow dy-
namics, etc., while also keeping the essence of multiagent
models, as applied to social or economic organization. It
therefore sheds light on the connection between those two
bodies of knowledge. E.B. has been partially supported
by CONICET of Argentina, PICT-PMT0051.
∗ Electronic address: burgos@cnea.gov.ar, ceva@cnea.gov.ar, rperazzo@itba.edu.ar
[1] N.F. Johnson, P.M. Hui, R. Jonson, T.S. Lo, Phys.Rev.
Lett. 82, 3360 (1999)
[2] D. Challet, M. Marsili, Phys. Rev. E60 R6271 (1999);
D. Challet, M. Marsili, R. Zecchina, Phys. Rev. Lett. 84,
1824 (2000)
[3] D. Harel, “Algorithmics. The spirit of computing”, page
83, Addison Wesley (1987)
[4] T. C. Schelling, J. of Math. Sociology 1, 143 (1971) and
Micromotives and macrobehavior, W.W. Norton & Com-
pany (1978), Chapter 4
[5] Moelbert S., De los Rios P. Physica A303,217,(2002).
Two works where related ideas about local neighborhoods
are developed, are M. Paczuski, K. E. Bassler, A. Corral,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 84, 3185 (2000), and T. Kalinowski, H-J.
Schulz, M. Briese, Physica A277, 502 (2000)
[6] E. Burgos, H. Ceva, R. P. J. Perazzo, Phys. Rev. E65,
036711 (2002)
[7] There are other stationary solutions, such as a saw-tooth
6profile repeating the pattern pi±1 = 1/2∓ ǫ and pi = 1/2.
These solutions are also unstable
[8] E. Burgos, H. Ceva, R. P. J. Perazzo, Physica A294, 539
(2001)
